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 DUNCAN MCCOLL CHESNEY
 Toward an Ethics of Silence:
 Michael K
 In this paper, by a focus on the representation of Michael K as a figure of silence
 in Life & Times of Michael K, 1 attempt to draw out J. M. Coetzee's assertion of a
 fundamental ethico-political aporia. This aporia, which derives in contemporary
 theory from Jacques Derrida and Maurice Blanchot's separate work on
 Emmanuel Levinas and expresses the constitutive gap between any given politics
 and individual ethical responsibility, is developed in somewhat different terms
 by Giorgio Agamben, upon whose reading of Herman Melville's character
 Bartleby I model my understanding of Michael K. The account of Bartleby as a
 figure of potentiality offered by Agamben provides both an intriguing explana
 tion of Michael K's curious irrecuperability as well as a possible pro-spective
 (utopian), euporic resolution of the antinomy that K embodies in a thinking of a
 "coming community." Through this reading I seek to address a misunderstand
 ing I find in much criticism of Coetzee's novel regarding its "political" shortcom
 ings. I then conclude with a suggestion about what Life & Times of Michael K, and
 Coetzee's work in general, teaches or reminds us about literature.
 The peculiarity of Herman Melville's great, enigmatic creation Bartleby derives from
 his unique lack of engagement—a lack that is in no way simply a refusal—exempli
 fied by his formula "I would prefer not to."1 Much has been written about Bartleby,
 and Giorgio Agamben's conception of him as a figure of contingency of potentiality
 maintained in radical passivity,2 is perhaps the most suggestive and pregnant for a
 thinking of the relation of the ethical to the political. By putting action in suspension
 through a maintenance of potentiality, "I would prefer not to" as the"restitutio in inte
 grum of possibility, which keeps possibility suspended between occurrence and
 nonoccurrence, between the capacity to be and the capacity not to be," necessarily
 draws attention to socially expected forms of understanding, behavior, and
 response.3 This leads the Wall Street lawyer, Bartleby's employer, to a critical self
 evaluation, almost to a breakdown, though in the end he seems incapable of really
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 understanding Bartleby's lesson. Bartleby's final words to the lawyer as he wastes
 away in prison, "I know where I am" (Melville 669), certainly sound like an admo
 nition, if not an outright condemnation of the lawyer's ethical failure.
 Bartleby's minimal formula should be understood as a form of silence. But the
 quiet of the "silent man," as Bartleby's fellow inmates dub him (670), cannot sim
 ply be understood as reticence. It is an indeterminate suspension of response that
 has the metalinguistic consequence of drawing attention to the discourse and to its
 practical as well as ethico-political presuppositions, one might say a (mute) "speech
 act" of passivity, whose illocutionary effect is a radical suspension of the conditions
 of response. Within Agamben's broader concerns, this potentiality does not simply
 indicate the social placement of any given discourse, but relates to the human con
 dition of language itself. In the preface to the French translation of his 1978 Infanzia
 e storia, Agamben delineates the contents of an unwritten book on the human voice
 and describes a fundamental experimentum linguae, an experience of language itself,
 of the thing of language (an experiment prepared by the Saussurean revolution in
 linguistics, as refined by Emile Benveniste and in a different way Roman Jakobson,
 and its reverberations in poststructuralist thought of the period, but an experiment
 also always implicit in the experience of poetry, broadly defined). There is no fun
 damental human voice, Agamben suggests, that is subsequently articulated by the
 letter, by grammar, into human speech. Voice—the mute, meaningful precondi
 tion of language assumed by the metaphysical tradition, by Martin Heidegger as
 well as G. W E Hegel—is an illusion (explored in the 1982 Language and Death).
 There is no ineffable silence or meaningful voice before language, merely the pre
 suppositional fact of language as such (always entered, as Claude Levi-Strauss
 argued, as a synchronic totality), which is experienced in the experimentum,
 through shifters, through rhetoric, through that which draws attention to the arti
 ficiality, conventionality, and nonreferentiality of language as a system.
 [T]here is no arthros, no articulation between phone and logos . . . The
 space between voice and logos is an empty space, a limit in the Kantian
 sense. Only because man finds himself cast into language without the
 vehicle of a voice, and only because the experimentum linguae lures him,
 grammarless, into that void and that aphonia, do an ethos and a com
 munity of any kind become possible.4
 So our very being, as animals without voice, cast into language, has radical impli
 cations for ethics and politics.
 Bartleby's silence is another invitation to this experiment. And it is very dis
 ruptive, as it shuts down the regular, smooth functioning of social speech. But as
 indeterminate, as silent, how can such a gesture have political or ethical signifi
 cance? Zizek, criticizing Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's discussion of
 Bartleby in Empire writes: "[I]n its political mode, Bartleby's 'I would prefer not
 to' is not the starting point of 'abstract negation' which should then be overcome
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.98 on Tue, 10 Jul 2018 15:19:29 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Toward an Ethics of Silence: Michael K  309
 in the patient positive work of the 'determinate negation' of the existing social
 universe, but a kind of arche, the underlying principle that sustains the entire
 movement: far from 'overcoming' it, the subsequent work of construction, rather,
 gives body to it."5 The arch-aic question posed by Bartleby's suspension of con
 vention is the very question of community.
 J. M. Coetzee, through Bartleby's avatar Michael K, reprises Melville's famous eth
 ical problematic in a minimally futuristic extrapolation from apartheid South
 Africa at one of its crisis points in the 1980s in his novel Life & Times of Michael
 K.6 By now, with Coetzee's canonization confirmed by the 2003 Nobel Prize for
 literature, the novel has become quite famous (originally winning the Booker
 Prize in 1983), although primarily within the narrow confines of Anglophone
 postcolonial literary criticism. However, the novel's resistance to that discipline's
 immediate concerns, like its initial ambivalent reception in a politically charged
 South Africa, can perhaps be understood by a new focus, an attentiveness to the
 silence and the ethical challenge of Michael K.
 In an early review of the book, while admitting an "allegorical dimension" of
 the novel and praising its able posing of difficult questions in the contemporary
 political environment, Nadine Gordimer laments "a revulsion against all politi
 cal and revolutionary solutions," noting that Coetzee "does not recognize what
 the victims, seeing themselves as victims no longer, have done, are doing, and
 believe they must do for themselves."7 She goes on to identify this as a failure to
 live up to a specifically Lukacsian notion of what literature should be.8 It is by
 now quite clear that Coetzee's novelistic vision has little to do with Lukacs (or
 indeed any Marxist or Marxian aesthetic),9 and that his contribution to the
 debate—on the political situation of apartheid, on the role of the writer in soci
 ety, on the political and ethical dimensions of art—realized (is realizing) its con
 siderable influence in different terms.
 Subsequent criticism continued to miss much of the subtlety of Coetzee's
 novel. For example, in one of the early monographs on Coetzee, Countries of the
 Mind: The Fiction of J. M. Coetzee,10 Dick Penner writes competently of Coetzee's
 relation to Franz Kafka as well as to the literary tradition of the Plaasroman and of
 John Steinbeck and the agrarian-protest novel, praising the novel among other
 reasons for "revealing the awakening consciousness of a primitive mind" (94). He
 concludes that the book is "an almost unqualified artistic success... an unforget
 table portrait of war-torn South Africa and Michael's evolving consciousness and
 sense of being" (111). The qualification—Penner's main criticism of the novel—
 is the second section, the medical officer's narrative, "an aesthetic choice that did
 not work as well as it might have... a consequence of Coetzee's feeling a necessity
 to include a point of view other than Michael K's" (110). On the contrary, I think
 a shift in focus on the novel can show this section to form an integral (and effec
 tively realized) role in the overall narrative.11
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 In a different vein (though one essentially more akin to Gordimer), Benita
 Parry suggests in a later and influential article that Coetzee's novels "circumvent,
 or rather confirm, that quandary of white writing's insecurity or dislocation in
 South Africa" (150), and that his "narrative strategies both enact a critique of
 dominant discourses and pre-empt dialogue with non-canonical knowledges
 through representing these as ineffable," (158) a charge I will address below.12
 More sophisticated readings have since emerged—most notably among the
 monographs, studies by David Attwell, Dominic Head, Sue Kossew, and Derek
 Attridge, and, admittedly, Coetzee's subsequent publications have made certain
 aspects of his earlier fiction stand out more.13 But generally something seems to
 be missing in the critical assessment of this key book in Coetzee's oeuvre.
 Michael K's silence has various obvious and metaphorical explanations: for
 example, his harelip, and his feelings of humiliation and intimidation (which
 combined lead to his perception by his interlocutors as "simple"); his status as
 son of silence, or a prohibition on speech, in the rules of the Huis Norenius, the
 state boarding school to which he is entrusted/abandoned by his mother
 (104-05); his marginalization (as nonwhite, proletarian), thus as one who has no
 "voice" in society. We can explain K's silence. How do we understand it?
 K's reticence in the novel is not just that of shame and intimidation. His silence
 is more profound and passes a harsher judgment on his "times." In numerous
 places K is likened in his behavior to an animal—indeed, in his own self-perception
 at the end of the novel, to a mole: "I am more like an earthworm, he thought. Which
 is also a kind of gardener. Or a mole, also a gardener, that does not tell stories
 because it lives in silence" (182). His experience on the mountain and the farm
 reduces him to sheer body, outside of human commerce and time, but if K is a fig
 ure of barely human existence, it is not in some mystical, presocial connection to
 the earth or in any equally mystical transcendence. He is, rather, an example of
 Giorgio Agamben's nuda vita, and "bare life is the product of the [biopolitical]
 machine and not something that preexists it, just as law has no court in nature or in
 the divine mind."14 K's peculiar existence is precisely produced by the society that
 has no place for him. The concept of bare life marks Agamben's exploration of
 Michel Foucault's analysis of modern biopower along with contemporary political
 thought about sovereignty deriving from Walter Benjamin's critique of Carl
 Schmitt—in essence, that the "state of exception" has become the norm. The
 emblem of this critical work by Agamben is homo sacer, a being abandoned—
 through concentration (camps) or marginalization—by the law, which in turn has
 become a force without content. K should be a token of this inclusive exclusion, but
 he persistently slips through boundary and definition.
 During his second stay at the farm in the Karoo, K muses: "What a pity that to live
 in times like these a man must be ready to live like a beast" (99). The times force
 K into bestiality, and the beast, of course, has no language, no articulate voice. K
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 reveals, in a somewhat different way, the indistinctness of the limit between
 human and nonhuman that is exemplified for Agamben in the "undignified,"
 destroyed Muselmann, another figure of silence, as of bare life.15 As this figure
 makes clear in Agamben's work, bare life is not simply zoe as opposed to bios, some
 sheer natural substrate underneath forms of social and communal life. Rather, it
 is a politicized form of natural life, life exposed to sovereign violence. K, in his
 silence, is then "witness" to the inhumanity of the society of camps and system
 atic violence. This brutalization leads to an understandable reticence: what can
 you say in the face of systematic and dehumanizing violence, injustice, and
 absurdity? For example, when K is first at Jakkalsdrif and is considering escape,
 a fellow intern chastises him, explaining that the camp is not a prison but a social
 service provided by the state for those without work, housing, and food. "Why
 should people with nowhere to go run away from the nice life we've got here ...
 Where do you come from that you do not know these things?" he asks K, who,
 surrounded by fences and men with guns, forcibly removed from his relative free
 dom in a society that in any case has already fallen apart, and confined to a com
 munal dorm with the "opportunity" for work that if eschewed can only lead to
 starvation, does not know what to answer. "K was silent. He did not understand
 who was being blamed" (78). What could K respond?16
 One answer is that K could respond in the "speech" of political action, and
 this brings us back to the initial critical response to the novel.17 One obvious, if
 literally "extra-diegetic," explanation of K's passivity and silence is provided by
 Coetzee in an interview with David Attwell: "The book about going off with the
 guerrillas, the book in the heroic tradition, is not a book I wanted-to-write, wanted
 enough to be able to bring off."18 This is simply not what the book aims to repre
 sent. But we do not need to refer to interviews to find an answer to the question
 of the political in Michael K, because different alternatives are presented and the
 matized within the text itself. The main example of political consciousness
 within the novel, since we are never given any clear representation of the guer
 rillas or the resistance, is in the figure of Robert, a fellow intern at Jakkalsdrif.
 Robert is a family man who worked as a laborer on a sheep farm for twelve years
 but was "let go" by his boss without warning or compensation to be replaced by
 a younger, cheaper, single man, and then picked up as an unemployed vagrant
 on the very road out of the farm. He is well aware that the camps exist not as social
 services of a welfare state but as services for the landowners, providing cheap,
 short-term "contract" labor rather than long-term jobs with the benefits that
 make a decent life possible. He acts as a would-be educator of K in political mat
 ters, commenting that the society needs and indeed wants the camps to exist, but
 requires that they be out of sight for the sake of seemliness and good conscience.
 To K's reluctance to understand and admit to this state of affairs, Robert responds,
 "You're a baby. You've been asleep all your life. It is time to wake up" (88). What
 Robert says does seem quite reasonable, and the reader is left wondering why K
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 cannot heed the "call" of political consciousness (as certain critics wondered of
 Coetzee in the 1970s and '80s).
 We learn still more about K during this episode. He ponders Robert's words:
 "He no longer found it strange to think of the camp as a place where people were
 deposited to be forgotten. It no longer seemed an accident that the camp lay out
 of sight of the town on a road that led nowhere else" (94). Perhaps Robert's Agam
 benian sense that the camp (and the state of exception that it embodies) has
 become the norm—"the camp was ... a privileged site where meaning erupted
 into the world" (165)—is pushing K to an epiphany, to a revolutionary political
 consciousness. But the insight remains undigested (95). Tellingly, K "could not
 yet believe that the two young men on the guardhouse porch would sit and watch
 with equanimity, yawning, smoking . . . while people were dying before their
 eyes" (94). K cannot think beyond the individuals he has contact with to a level
 of abstraction necessary for political consciousness. Yet K even imagines a sce
 nario in which all of the inmates dig a vast mass grave and simply lie in it as all of
 the evidence of the internment and extermination is piled on top of them and
 everything forever put out of sight and memory. Is K's resistance to abstraction,
 despite a repressed, fantastical knowledge of the "truth," simply a surface naivete,
 an inability to imagine "Hitler's willing executioners" and the larger script direct
 ing their actions? K appears to think only in terms of individuals and situations.
 His "simplicity" consists partly in his unskillfulness at abstractions and princi
 ples. Earlier, when the good Samaritan has expressed his practical philosophy of
 helping others, K is skeptical:
 "People must help each other, that's what I believe." K allowed this utter
 ance to sink into his mind. Do I believe in helping people? he wondered.
 He might help people, he might not help them, he did not know before
 hand, anything was possible. He did not seem to have a belief, or did not
 seem to have a belief regarding help. (48)
 K seems to occupy the space of contingency with respect to others. Like Bartleby,
 he "dwells obstinately in the abyss of potentiality."19 He will not speak and
 commit himself over to an authoritative narrative, just as he will not engage in a
 political struggle and give himself over to abstract principles. But his radical
 passivity forces us (those who would narrate) into an exasperated state of un
 certainty, and either we dismiss him as childishly apolitical (Robert), or we
 redouble our efforts to make him speak or, ultimately, to give voice to his silence
 (the medical officer). In neither case do we respect the potentiality of his silence,
 the silence of his potentiality, the "responsibility of his response without
 response" as Derrida writes of Bartelby.20 How can we be responsible to this
 silence? How can we understand K's position here?
 In the first case, we might ask with K, who are "people?" How can they be
 known "beforehand," prior to the situation in which they are encountered? This
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 is an example of what Derrida identifies as the aporia of responsibility,21 of ethical
 action. "Responsibility . . . demands on the one hand an accounting, a general
 answering-for-oneself with respect to the general and before the generality, hence
 the idea of substitution, and, on the other hand, uniqueness, absolute singularity,
 hence non-substitution, non-repetition, silence, and secrecy."22 Derrida is refer
 ring here to oneself as both substitutable and unique, but this applies all the more
 to the one to whom one is responsible. "Ethics is ... the order of and respect for
 absolute singularity, and not only that of the generality or of the repetition of the
 same."23 Ethics must involve principled, which is to say abstract, beliefs and
 imperatives, but the ethical act can never be merely the application of such prin
 ciples, for responsibility is responsibility to and for the singular other, not simply
 with respect to principle or duty, and duty cannot be subjection to a universal law
 but must be my choice of my law and thus unsubstitutably unique. K is a figura
 tion of silent, unsubstitutable singularity and, like Bartleby, demands a realization
 of the inadequacy of principle in the face of the contingent, unexpected singular.
 At this point it will be instructive to look at one interpretation of K's behav
 ior, that of the medical officer in part 2, who famously concludes: "Your stay in
 the camp was merely an allegory ... of how scandalously, how outrageously a
 meaning can take up residence in a system without becoming a term in it"
 (166).24 The obvious reason the medical officer's narrative is included in the
 book, in addition to providing some outside account of K (which is not really nec
 essary, since all we get in the novel are outside versions of K: the reaction of sol
 diers, fellow interns, and so on, as well as that of the seemingly omniscient, but
 actually distancing narrator),25 is quite specifically in order to provide a quasi
 official, white interpretation that is as well-meaning as it is wrong. The medical
 officer is a "benevolent imperialist," a colonial representative with a bad con
 science (another version of the Magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians):26 a well
 intentioned, thoughtful man whose structural position and imperial will to
 narrate preclude a real understanding of Michael K; and the inclusion of his nar
 rative is extremely important as thematic material included within the overall
 narrative. Indeed, it both suggests intelligent but incorrect interpretations of K's
 life, and demands what Gayatri Spivak calls a "counterfocalization" against the
 narrative perspective of the officer.27
 The officer's misprision may help us to understand K's seemingly inscrutable
 challenge. The first thing to be said about part 2 is that the official record of
 Michael K is incorrect on almost every count, beginning with his name. The med
 ical officer's superior, Major Noel van Rensburg, refers to the register: "Michaels
 is an arsonist. He is also an escapee from a labour camp. He was running a flour
 ishing garden on an abandoned farm and feeding the local guerrilla population
 when he was captured. That is the story of Michaels" (131). Noel tries to push the
 medical officer to release K in the interests of turnaround, but the latter insists K's
 health will not allow it. Despite this obvious professional and human concern,
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 and the patent absurdity of the official description of K as an insurgent Opgaarder
 (137), the medical officer's defense is not much better: "Michaels is an idiot. . .
 [who] doesn't know how to strike a match" (131); he is "otherworldly" (130;
 142);28 he fears a vengeful mother (150), and is useless in this world, a "mistake"
 (155). It is the obvious inadequacy and falsity of this characterization that forces
 a "counterfocalization" of the narration. Why does the medical officer see things
 this way, and what is impossible for him to see in K? What can we see?
 First, of course, we must consider the ways in which the officer is not wrong.
 He does recognize the inadequacy of the official story and K's unsuitability to the
 system, the torn society of civil war (South Africa), but he hardly draws the most
 insightful conclusions. The officer's attempts at metaphorical capture reveal cer
 tain things in this respect. He first thinks of K as a stone (135). This expresses a
 sense of K as a figure of impervious passivity, and of the earth, but at the cost of
 dehumanizing him (and therefore de-linking him from human relation—as does
 the descriptive "otherworldly," although in the stone image he is all too worldly),
 and without passing any judgment on the society for which he is such a misfit.
 Later he changes the metaphor to that of a stick insect (149), emphasizing K's
 physical and dispositional awkwardness and alterity when displaced from his
 proper habitat. The stick insect's is a very morphology of invisibility, of course,
 though only within its proper sphere, and the image presumes that the marginal
 slums of the Cape are where K belongs, harmless (unharmed?) and invisible. This
 also suggests an understanding of K's relationship to soil and shrubbery, to the
 earth (rather than the "land" in the Afrikaaner ideology), honing in on K's gar
 dener nature, but by making a silly assessment of K's sense of duty to his mother
 (150; contrast with 7-8, where she is associated with the soil and an escape from
 the violence of Cape Town, and thus with a touching duty to return her to the
 farm in Prince Albert) and, of course, continuing to distance K from a social,
 human context. Later the medical officer likens K to a holdover from a different
 age, "like the coelacanth or the last man to speak Yaqui" (151)—but who were K's
 similars, when was their age? And if K is the last of a linguistic kind, what is his
 language but that of silence? Finally, as in some early mythology, the medical offi
 cer thinks of K as a "handful of dust," a clay man (161), or rather a clay figure, un
 manned, an extension of the earth and not created for human intercourse. In
 every case the officer refuses to place K within a human, social context in which
 his unsuitability can have critical meaning.
 This metaphorical grasping is part of the officer's general will to narrate—
 which we see even in his dealings with his nurse assistant, Felicity (158)—for the
 officer, among other things, is another Coetzean figuration of the writer (as well
 as of imperial authority). It is well known that one of Coetzee's main predilections
 is a concern with textuality, especially as it relates to authority.29 Who has the
 right to speak for whom, and what are the representational, political, and ethical
 limits of such speaking? From Dusklands (1974) through his most recent work,
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 and especially in Foe, this is explicitly thematized.301 do not want to explore this
 issue at present, but simply wish to draw attention to the arrogated authority and
 masked violence that is implicit in this will to narrate K. The convoluted
 metaphoricity of the episode (from inorganic, to organic, to ethereal
 transcendental and back to inorganic dust) is one mark of this will and its frus
 tration. One passage makes clear the thwarting of this desire. The officer and his
 superior interrogate K but get no answers and grow increasingly angry: "The
 silence lengthened. Noel did not speak, passing the whole burden to me. 'Come
 on, Michaels,' I said, 'we haven't got all day, there is a war on!"' (138). Finally K
 responds: "I am not in the war," causing extreme irritation in his interlocutors.
 Then, after a few unsatisfying sentences that are extracted with great difficulty
 and that in no way add up to the desired resistance narrative, K falls silent: "There
 was a silence so dense that I heard it as a ringing in my ears, a silence of the kind
 one experiences in mine shafts, cellars, bomb shelters, airless places" (140). The
 silence completely exasperates the medical officer and brings an end to the inter
 rogation. But the officer is stuck in anger and frustration and does not begin to
 think the meaning of this silence.31
 An influential, negative interpretation of K's silence is offered rather forcefully by
 Benita Parry: "My hypothesis about Coetzee's figures of silence ... is that although
 they are disentitled, and are therefore available to be read as manifesting subordi
 nation to, and retreat from, a subjugated condition, the potential critique of politi
 cal oppression is diverted by the conjuring and endorsing of a non-verbal signifying
 system," which she describes as "mystic consciousness" or a "transcendent state."32
 Ultimately, combined with an abstracting away of the landscape and the particular
 cultural marks of the specific setting, the gesture "dissipates the engagement with
 political conditions it also inscribes."33 So Coetzee is implicated, despite his con
 siderable efforts to the contrary, in an imperious deafness to the eloquence of the
 speech, as well as the silence, of the South African oppressed. His recourse to fig
 ures of ineffability is (again) a political retreat. My suggestion is that despite the
 complexity of her argument and her presumed attunement to these other voices,
 Parry herself is quite deaf to K's silence and closed to Coetzee's experiment.34 It is
 not true that K is represented as transcendent. Half of the examples Parry offers to
 substantiate her argument are taken from the narrative of the medical officer, but
 we have no reason to agree with his interpretation. The other examples refer to
 effects of K's hunger. As far as Life & Times of Michael K is concerned, Parry's argu
 ment is thus unsubstantiated.35 This leads one to the idea that for Parry the prob
 lem is not so much that Coetzee writes a novel about a silent nonwhite character,
 but that he writes about a nonwhite character at all. Coetzee cannot be silent for
 "the other" any more than he can speak for "the other." There are obvious problems
 with this suggestion—its essentialism, its projected aesthetic and ethical prohibi
 tion—which can no longer be seriously maintained. If Coetzee is not doomed from
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 the start in his novelistic project, then we should listen closely to the silence of K,
 as I attempt to do in this article. I believe Coetzee uses K as a figure of a nontran
 scendent, disruptive silence in order to stage the complexity of the relationship of
 ethical responsibility to political action. K will not easily be subsumed within any
 one's simple narrative (fool, Opgaarder, mystic, Bartleby avatar). He is an aporetic
 figure that will not be simplified. The medical officer's narrative is included to make
 this point.
 The medical officer does all he can, short of force-feeding K, to keep him alive
 and to make him talk. But while K is not as silent as the mute Friday in Foe, he sim
 ply will not allow the officer purchase on his tale, merely turning the questioning
 around to a query the officer cannot answer: "No one was interested before in what
 I ate ... so I ask myself why... What is it to this man [the officer] if I live or die?"
 (148). K's question leads the officer to self-doubt, and extends, in a postmodern,
 self-reflective way, the lawyer's problematic in "Bartleby." The officer echoes K's
 question in response: "Why me?" (149) in what Attridge identifies in a different
 context as an example of a bewildered response to the disruptive arrivant (Ethics of
 Reading 120-23). The arrivant is a term Derrida uses to refer to "the singularity of
 who arrives, he or she who comes, coming to be where s/he was not expected, where
 one was awaiting him or her without waiting for him or her, without expecting it,
 without knowing what or whom to expect, what or whom I am waiting for."36 The
 officer is forced by K's unanticipated apparition into the realization: "I am not ready"
 (149). This is, of course, precisely the mark of the ethical situation: that for which
 one is not ready. But he does not know how to help K, how to understand the silent
 call of this arrivant, and instead tries to speak for him, to give him voice in a narra
 tive , thus foreclosing an ethical response by recourse to already known strategies of
 interaction and discourse. The arrivant is related to Agamben's concept of quodlibet
 (qualunque, quelconque), any being whatsoever to whom and for whom we are
 responsible, and forming the basis of a Utopian ethical community to come.37 This
 community is inimical to the state as such, and thus to politics. "The threat the state
 is not willing to come to terms with is precisely the fact that the unrepresentable
 should exist and form a community without either presuppositions or conditions
 of belonging."38 K represents a limit case of the ethical obligation at the basis of this
 conception of community: the one that cannot be understood, who is precisely dis
 similar, unassimilable—in short, the other. He demands a realization of obligation
 in the absence of any marks that place him within a community (the ethnic, the
 political). As Maurice Blanchot has tellingly written, glossing Levinas (but not, to
 my mind, sufficiently distancing himself from Levinas's theological assumptions
 and implications):
 Man as autrui, always coming from the outside, always without a coun
 try in relation to me, a stranger to all possession, dispossessed and with
 out dwelling place, he who is as if "by definition" the proletarian ... does
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 not enter into dialogue with me. If I speak to him, I invoke him and
 speak to him as the one I can neither reach nor place at my disposal;
 when he speaks to me, he speaks to me by way of the infinite distance
 he is from me, and his speech announces precisely this infinite, thereby
 inviting me, through his powerlessness, his destitution, and his strange
 ness, to a relation that is "incommensurable with a power exercised, a
 conquest, a joyful possession or a knowledge."39
 This passage presents quite a powerful image of the other by keeping it ambiva
 lent, as Coetzee does in Mi chad K, poised between an historically and socioeco
 nomically situated individual, and a parabolic figure of the gap between ethical
 obligation and epistemological purchase. As incommensurable with a will to
 knowledge exercised through a particular structure of power, K, as a challenging
 example of this autrui, is obviously completely exasperating to the medical offi
 cer, who gradually loses his grip on his social role, as on his narrative, in the face
 of this enigma.
 Increasingly dissatisfied with his professional position, the officer, after K's
 "escape," even imagines following him, forcing him, through speech, to realize
 that he (the officer) has indeed understood his lesson. He would have become a
 disciple. But to what? "1 am convinced that there are areas that lie between the
 camps and belong to no camp, not even to the catchment areas of the camps ...
 I am looking for such a place in order to settle there" (162). The officer is merely
 looking for escape. He has interpreted K as a figure of escape or evasion,40 of
 negation: '"I was the only one who saw that you were more than you seemed to
 be... Slowly, as your persistent No, day after day, gathered weight, I began to feel
 that you were more than just another patient'" (164). For him, K manifests an
 indefatigable, though passive, will of resistance (163), and he realizes the mean
 ing of the camp, embodied in K, who of course remains outside of the camp, as
 an escape artist who knows how to find the one safe haven, and turning his back
 on a war that is not his, can (apolitically) tend his garden (with the attendant
 Voltairean sense—ironic, of course—of resignation and retreat).
 It seems that by placing the officer's narrative at the heart of the novel, Coet
 zee is suggesting by its failures that his own "narrative" of Michael K is equally and
 similarly flawed. By drawing attention to the impossibility of the literary capture
 of the "other," compounded by the power relation of the social structure, Coetzee
 raises the question of the role of literature itself (as well as, if we accept the read
 ings of Michael Marais, Tamlyn Monson, and others, that of ethics as a project of
 impossible responsibility). While Monson's Blanchotian answer (102-03) is per
 haps plausible—that Coetzee succeeds in his failure (as literature does) rather
 than failing in his success as Marais, Parry, and others have suggested—we might
 restate it as yet another example of the need for what Spivak calls "the persistent
 critique of what we cannot not want," that is, deconstruction.41 We have to relate
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 to the other, although we have to recognize the restrictions and difficulties in doing
 so as a fundamental aporetic condition that could not be overcome by the amass
 ing of facts from archives, interviews, and eyewitness accounts. But in being aware
 of this we have to want to narrate and understand anyhow, and for this, more and
 mere facts do help, even if we only ever learn much about ourselves and narration
 itself. So narration is worthwhile that includes within its necessary attempt to
 describe and assess an ethical, historical, and political situation the awareness of
 the severe epistemological, ethical, and historical limits on the project of (such)
 narration. Thus the necessity of the medical officer's narrative and the necessity of
 its inadequacy or failure.
 There is some textual evidence outside of the officer's narrative for his conception
 of K as "escape artist," however unheroic.42 At one point K considers, in a thought
 very far from simple: "Perhaps the truth is that it is enough to be out of the camps,
 out of all the camps at the same time. Perhaps that is enough of an achievement,
 for the time being. How many people are there left who are neither locked up nor
 standing guard at the gate? I have escaped the camps; perhaps, if I lie low, I will
 escape the charity too" (182). In the repetition of the word "perhaps," the passage
 simultaneously disavows, or at least challenges, this interpretation, while it also
 shows an awareness that in an unjust society no one is free, whatever side of the
 barbed-wire fence one finds oneself on. In Agamben's terms, in the generalized
 state of exception of modern politics, "we are all virtually homines sacri."43 K,
 however, is ultimately not a figure of escape. For one thing, none of his escapes is
 heroic, because in no case is he really hindered. Likewise, in no instance is his
 escape a triumph of will, of a "persistent No." As Agamben says of Bartleby, we
 may say of K: "nothing is further from him than the pathos of negation"
 ("Bartleby" 256).44 K exists in a space of priority to any particular will, desire, or
 motivation. His curious lack of will throughout the book is both an obvious result
 of his hunger as well as a function of his meaning within the ethical parable.
 To understand this helpless lack of will, Agamben again provides a sugges
 tive and insightful figure in his theorizing of infancy. In a brief section of Idea of
 Prose titled "The Idea of Infancy," Agamben discusses the axolotl as a symbol of
 potentiality. This creature, a curious larval form of a salamander that has evolu
 tionarily developed reproductive capacities of its own, thus before its full,
 "proper," somatic development, is for Agamben a symbol of infancy as such. "Let
 us try to imagine an infant that, unlike the axolotl, does not merely keep its lar
 val environment and retain its own immature form, but is, as it were, so com
 pletely abandoned to its own state of infancy, and so little specialized and so
 totipotent that it rejects any specific destiny and any determined environment in
 order to hold onto its immaturity and helplessness."43 This links back to the dis
 cussion in one of his first books, Infancy and History, of the capability of experi
 ence that we have lost in modernity, but which remains (theoretically) possible
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 in the language-less potentiality of infancy (from Latin infantia, the inability to
 speak). While aware that an infantilization of Michael K is dangerous—indeed is
 precisely the (mis)treatment he gets by most of the people he encounters in his
 j ourneys—I believe Agamben's very different concept of infancy is quite relevant
 to the book. And indeed, if we keep in mind Agamben's claim in Homo Sacer that
 "the question 'In what way does the living being have language?' corresponds
 exactly to the question 'In what way does bare life dwell within the polis?' The liv
 ing being has logos by taking away and conserving its own voice in it, even as it
 dwells in the polis by letting its own bare life be excluded, as an exception, within
 it," then this issue goes to the heart of Agamben's work, and of Coetzee's concerns
 in this novel and others, not only those focused on figures of silence, but also his
 more recent work on minimal ethical obligation in the absence of dignity and
 grace (Elizabeth Costello [2003], Disgrace [1999], Slow Man [2005], and even the
 Diary of a Bad Year [2007]).46 K's refusal of speech, his maintenance of potential
 ity with respect to a world none of whose options are (yet) desirable, is a refusal
 of the state of exception that governs his society. Not a determinate critique, not
 politics per se, but a recusation (and consequent accusation).
 Whether there is any intimation in the novel of a euporic passage from the
 aporetic situation embodied by K is uncertain.47 And Agamben's elliptical sug
 gestions about the "Coming Community" are among the most frustrating in his
 work. Of the quodlibet, Agamben suggests: "Whatever singularity which . . .
 rejects all identity and every condition of belonging, is the principal enemy of the
 State."48 The state and the sovereignty it represents are inimical to this ethical sin
 gularity. This at least seems clear throughout Coetzee's novel. Thus, "the novelty
 of the coming politics is that it will no longer be a struggle for the conquest or con
 trol of the State, but a struggle between the state and the non-State (humanity),
 an insurmountable disjunction between whatever singularity and the State
 organization."49 Coetzee's novel ends with K escaping the solicitude of "Decem
 ber," the Cape Town pimp, and his "sisters," and returning to his mother's old ser
 vant's room, where he imagines a return to the country, this time in the role of
 caregiver to an imagined vagrant who has apparently taken shelter in the aban
 doned space.50 It is not clear what image of community this would represent,
 except in the transformation of the perceived and reluctant care-receiver to care
 giver, flipping the polarity of obligation and thus expanding from singularity to
 something like community. Agamben's imperfect articulation of a new notion of
 community in spite or because of the fundamental alterity between any given sin
 gular individuals, is nonetheless compelling. The original and uncommitted
 potentiality represented by K (as by Bartleby) is precisely the stage at which we
 must think ethical community and any subsequent politics (the arche, according
 to Zizek, subtending any political program).
 Returning to silence, of the experimentum linguae and the community this
 fundamental experience of language presupposes, Agamben suggests:
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 The first outcome of the experimentum linguae, therefore, is a radical
 revision of the very idea of Community. The only content of the experi
 mentum is that there is language, we cannot represent this, by the domi
 nant model in our culture, as a language, as a state or a patrimony of
 names and rules which each people transmit from generation to gener
 ation. It is, rather, the unpresupposable non-latency in which men have
 always dwelt, and in which, speaking, they move and breathe.51
 Like Bartleby, by drawing attention to language as such, K begs this insight. But this
 experience of silence, this rediscovery of infancy, with all of its experiential poten
 tiality, is also a removal from the Aristotelian sphere of justice itself.52 At question is
 the very limit of justice at the limit of the human, a topic that is increasingly of inter
 est to Coetzee. Agamben's sovereign-less, post-historical, Utopian land (not State)
 of the Good Life hardly seems a clear answer to the problem posed by Coetzee in
 Michael K. But neither does any simple political program of representation, recon
 ciliation, or reform. Herein lies the real political value of Coetzee's novel.
 Disruptive arrivant, new incarnation of Bartleby, K is an ethical figure, an
 embodiment of an ethical problematic. K (the ethical) will not be encompassed by
 (subsumed under) the war (the political), just as he will not be narrated (under
 stood) by the medical officer. As Spivak has written, "It is practically persuasive that
 the eruption of the ethical interrupts and postpones the epistemological—the
 undertaking to construct the other as object of knowledge, an undertaking never
 to be given up. "53 Spivak continues by suggesting "that the discontinuities between
 the ethical and the epistemological and political fields are tamed in the nestling of
 logic and rhetoric in fiction."54 She goes on to discuss, among other things, Dis
 grace, but it is clear that Michael K poses this incompatibility or discontinuity at the
 same time as it rhetorically "tames" or unites the spheres in a fictionally complex
 way. K is a figure of the ethical that resists the will to knowledge (however writerly)
 of the colonial representative as it resists subsumption into a properly political
 struggle (K does not join the guerrillas).55 As such, as irrecuperable, K figures one
 of Coetzee's most important points: how the ethical must "norm" the political and
 never simply, beforehand, be prejudged, understood, and added to the calcula
 tion.56 Indeed K is perhaps the most convincing exploration of this problematic in
 Coetzee's oeuvre, and as such is a valuable example of that "nestling" that charac
 terizes great writing. According to certain aesthetic criteria (underlying negative
 criticism in the 1980s and '90s), the book is more problematic than productive. But
 as Agamben suggests, in this respect in agreement with as different a thinker as Spi
 vak, the complex maintenance of a "condition of perpetual potentiality" for
 thought is the highest vocation of art,57 and, incidentally, the only way it can really
 have political significance.
 Through his silence, his maintenance—which is strictly irreducible to
 will—of potentiality, K figures the never-to-be-eliminated ethico-political apo
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 ria. As aporia, it gives "no passage," yet precisely in such a situation we must pro
 ceed. "I can't go on, I'll go on." In no way does this suggest that the political is
 impossible or avoidable, just as the failure of narrative (the officer) in no way sig
 nifies the futility of narration. Rather, K is a reminder that the undecidable
 moment of potentiality and decision is never dealt with once and for all, just as a
 deconstructive-postcolonial insight into the nature of power and language is
 never understood away into a banality.58 Through his staging of K's eloquent
 silence, of his obduracy without will, Coetzee, following and extending Melville,
 teaches us caution and attentiveness in thinking the ethico-political relation,
 even in a climate where the "right" action or speech seems most obvious.
 Bilkent University
 Notes
 1. Herman Melville, "Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall-Street," in Melville, ed. Har
 rison Hayford (New York: Library of America, vol. 3, 1984), 635-72. Slavoj Zizek
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 allax View (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 381 (emphasis Zizek's).
 2. Giorgio Agamben, "Bartleby, or On Contingency," in Potentialities, ed. and trans.
 Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 243-71. On
 Agamben and radical passivity, see Thomas Carl Wall, Radical Passivity (Albany: State
 University of New York, 1999), especially chapter 4.
 3. Agamben, "Bartleby," 267.
 4. Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History, trans. Liz Heron (1978; London: Verso, 2007),
 9-10. He writes elsewhere: "There can be no true human community on the basis of
 a presupposition—be it a nation, a language, or even the a priori of communication
 of which hermeneutics speaks. What unites human beings among themselves is not
 a nature, a voice, or a common imprisonment in signifying language; it is the vision
 of language itself, and, therefore, the experience of language's limits, its end." Agam
 ben, "The Idea of Language," in Potentialities, 47.
 5. Zizek, Parallax View, 382.
 6. J. M. Coetzee, Life & Times of Michael K (New York: Viking, 1984).
 7. Nadine Gordimer, "The Idea of Gardening," in Critical Essays on J. M. Coetzee, ed. Sue
 Kossew (New York: Hall, 1998), 143.
 8. For Coetzee's opinion of Georg Lukacs and the continuing viability of his work, see
 the interview (197-209) with David Attwell in Doubling the Point (Cambridge: Har
 vard University Press, 1992), especially 202. Earlier in his academic career, however,
 Coetzee was not above using Lukacs as a critical tool; see the essay "Man's Fate in the
 Novels of Alex la Guma" (1974), reprinted in ibid., 344-60.
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 9. Although for an attempt at a reconciliation of Coetzee with that tradition, in this case
 with the anti-Lukacsian Theodor Adorno, see Neil Lazarus, "Modernism and Moder
 nity: T. W Adorno and Contemporary White South African Literature," Cultural Cri
 tique 5 (Winter 1986-1987): 131-55. Also on this topic, see the early assessment
 (1982) by Michael Vaughan, "Literature and Politics: Currents in South African Writ
 ing in the Seventies," in Kossew, Critical Essays, 50-65.
 10. Dick Penner, Countries of the Mind: The Fiction ofJ. M. Coetzee (New York: Greenwood
 Press, 1989).
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 third-person point of view; part 2 is a first-person narrative told, in various formats,
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 12. Benita Parry, "Speech and Silence in the Fictions of J. M. Coetzee," in Writing South
 Africa: Literature, Apartheid, and Democracy, 1970-1995, ed. Derek Attridge and Rose
 mary Jolly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 149-65.
 13. Most notably Coetzee's Foe (1986), which further undermines the authority of narra
 tion and presents/obfuscates the actually mute character of Friday, and Age of Iron
 (1990), which complicates the relationship between the benevolent white narrator
 and the reluctant, taciturn, obscure nonwhite arrivant.
 14. Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (2003; Chicago: University of
 Chicago Press, 2005), 87-98. As the medical officer expresses it in part 2: "Michaels
 ... approached, I thought, as near to a state of life in death or death in life, whatever
 it was, as is humanly possible" (Michael K159). He is the emblem, as homo sacer, of the
 generalized state of exception that marks the broken, violent society of camps, sur
 veillance, and repression. This Agambenian point suggests that K should be taken as
 a fundamental parabolic figure of his society and its constitutive power relations as
 much as a specific case of a disempowered and disenfranchised individual in the spe
 cific political conjecture of late apartheid. See also Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and
 Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (1995; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
 1998), especially 119-35and 166-80. Foracritique of Agamben's ahistorical use of
 the "state of exception," see Andreas Kalyvas, "The Sovereign Weaver: Beyond the
 Camp," in Politics, Metaphysics, and Death, ed. Andrew Norris (Durham, NC: Duke
 University Press, 2005), 107-34.
 15. See Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz (Homo Sacer III): The Witness and the
 Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (1998; New York: Zone, 1999), chapter 2. For a
 critique of Agamben's use of the Muselmann, including in relation to language, see
 J. M. Bernstein, "Intact and Fragmented Bodies: Versions of Ethics 'after Auschwitz,'"
 New German Critique 97, 31:1 (2006): 31-52.
 16. Later, to the soldier guarding the entrance to the camp, K does come up with a dis
 arming and simple response: "I don't want to be in a camp, that's all" (85). Curiously,
 the man who speaks to K at this point is later (79) revealed to be the very Robert who
 represents political consciousness in the novel. This perhaps makes his initial state
 ments to K ironic.
 17. For a summary of this criticism, see Kossew, "Introduction," 3. Subsequent recuper
 ations of the text insist on its political pertinence, but displaced in a postcolonial,
 postmodern, poststructuralist version of a Frankfurt School (or Tel Quel) emphasis on
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 only on the level of form and never explicitly and solely as a matter of ostensibly polit
 ical content. Since its initial reception, almost all critics of the novel have argued a ver
 sion of this account with respect to the political in one form or another. I do not
 disagree here so much as focus on the aporetic relationship of the political to the eth
 ical that is staged in the novel.
 18. Coetzee, Doubling the Point, 207-08.
 19. Agamben, "Bartleby," 254.
 20. Jacques Derrida, Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago
 Press, 1995), 75.
 21. "The concept of responsibility . . . [is] paralyzed by what can be called an aporia ...
 That has never stopped it from 'functioning,' as one says. On the contrary, it operates
 so much better, to the extent that it serves to obscure the abyss or fill in its absence of
 foundation, stabilizing a chaotic process of change in what are called conventions."
 Ibid., 84.
 22. Ibid., 61. See also Derrida, "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,"
 Cardozo Law Review 11, no. 5-6 (1990): 920-1045, especially the first aporia, that of
 epokhe and rule (961-67).
 23. Derrida, Gift of Death, 84.
 24. Incidentally, this comment is taken by most critics of the book as an invitation to con
 nect Coetzee with a deconstructionist project ascribed to Derrida. Attwell, for example,
 writes, "One might speak of K as the narratological figure of the Derridean trace." J. M.
 Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing (Berkeley: University of California Press,
 1993), 99. Dominic Head, while drawing attention to the questionably of the officer's
 interpretation (J. M. Coetzee [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 106-07),
 nonetheless, like Attwell and others, assumes that some insight about K is captured in
 this formulation. What seems misguided in this line of interpretation is not so much the
 linking with Derrida as the conclusion drawn that this is a postmodernist moment of
 the self-deconstruction of the authority of narrative, of language—or, rather, that it is
 primarily such a moment. While Coetzee is often interested in similar problems, I think
 a different insight is at work here, for surely Coetzee's point in Michael K isn't that there
 is no certain meaning ascribable to this society, or that its meaning is a blind spot inac
 cessible within and supplementary to the system. Rather, the meaning is all too obvi
 ous: this is an unjust society; everyone in it is forced to live a wrong life. K happens to be
 a persistent reminder of an all-too-apparent truth.
 25. On narrative distance in the novel, see Derek Attridge, J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of
 Reading (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 50-52.
 26. As Attwell asserts of Waitingfor the Barbarians (1980), Coetzee, through the narrative
 strategy in Michael K, "does not presume to speak from a position outside of the colo
 nial episteme" (93). On the Magistrate as "benevolent imperialist," see Gayatri Spi
 vak, Death of a Discipline (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 20-23. Also
 see Stephen Watson's discussion in "Colonialism in the Novels of J. M. Coetzee," in
 Critical Perspectives on J. M. Coetzee, ed. Graham Huggan and Stephen Watson (Lon
 don: Macmillan, 1996), 13-36.
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 27. Gayatri Spivak, "Ethics and Politics in Tagore, Coetzee, and Certain Scenes of Teach
 ing," Diacritics 32, no. 3-4 (2002): 22.
 28. Contra Parry (see 154), it is the medical officer, not Coetzee, who offers this version
 of K in a thoroughly questionable interpretation.
 29. Generalizing from the medical officer's narrative, Michael Marais suggests in "Litera
 ture and the Labour of Negation: J. M. Coetzee's Life & Times of Michael K" (Journalof
 Commonwealth Literature 36, no. 1 [2001]): 107-25, that "Coetzee represents writing
 as a space in which the subject loses control over the other" (116), and that from this
 we can understand Coetzee to argue "that the relation which writing establishes with
 otherness invests literature with the ability to disturb the self-consolidating relation
 that is at the base of sociality" (119).
 30. For an interesting discussion of Foe in this context, see Gayatri Spivak, A Critique of
 Postcolonial Reason (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 169-97, as well as
 Lewis MacLeod, '"Do We of Necessity Become Puppets in a Story?' or Narrating the
 World: On Speech, Silence, and Discourse inj. M. Coetzee's Foe" (Modern Fiction Stud
 ies 52, no. 1, [2006]): 1-18.
 31. For a different but reasonable take on this silence that focuses more on its straightfor
 ward political meaning, see Michael Marais, "The Hermeneutics of Empire: Coetzee's
 Post-Colonial Metafiction," in Huggan and Watson, ed., Critical Perspectives, 66-81.
 32. Parry, "Silence," 53,153,158.
 33. Ibid., 164; see also 160-61.
 34. A strong initial criticism of Parry's polemic can be found in the fifth chapter of Sue
 Kossew, Pen and Power: A Post-Colonial Reading of J. M. Coetzee and Andre Brink (Ams
 terdam: Rodopi, 1996), although she does not draw out the theoretical implications
 I find most compelling in the novel.
 35. Foe, though more complicated, is also misinterpreted, again by a mix of mistake (121)
 and misreading of the narrative texture, in this instance of according straightforward
 meaning to the suggestions of the author Foe, to say nothing of the final section's
 dream narration.
 36. Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
 Press, 1993), 33.
 37. Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt (1990; Minneapolis:
 University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 1-2. This thinking of the "coming community"
 through the idea of quodlibet is also related to Derrida's problematic of conditional and
 unconditional hospitality. See Anne Dufourmantelle and Jacques Derrida, Of Hospi
 tality, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000). On crit
 ical differences in the messianic communities envisioned by the two philosophers,
 see Catherine Mills, "Agamben's Messianic Politics: Biopolitics, Abandonment, and
 Happy Life" (Contretemps 5 [December 2004]), 42-62. For problems with Agamben's
 vague conception of the coming community, see Kalyvas, 114-17.
 38. Giorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and
 Cesare Casarino (1996; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 89.
 39. Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson (1969; Minneapo
 lis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 56.
 40. AttwellJ. M. Coetzee, 92-93.
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 46. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 8.
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 48. Agamben, Coming Community, 87.
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 51. Agamben, Infancy and History, 10.
 52. "Man is the only animal who has the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an
 indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals ... the power of
 speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the
 just and the unjust." Politics I.ii. 9-15, trans. B. Jowett, injonathan Barnes, TheComplete
 Works of Aristotle, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
 53. Spivak, "Ethics and Politics," 17.
 54. Ibid., 17-18.
 55. What Gilles Deleuze ("Bartleby; or The Formula," in Essays Critical and Clinical, trans.
 Daniel W Smith [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997]) says of Bartleby
 has resonance here: "If Bartleby had refused, he could still be seen as a rebel or insur
 rectionary, and as such would still have a social role. But the formula stymies all
 speech acts, and at the same time, it makes Bartleby a pure outsider to whom no social
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